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THE ADJUDICATION OF VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT: ALLOWING ALIEN PLAINTIFFS THEIR
DAY IN FEDERAL COURT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1945, Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat who had saved more than

100,000 Jews from the Nazis, disappeared when the Soviets invaded Budapest, Hungary. Seventeen-year-old Joelito Filartiga died in 1976 after being
tortured by police in Asuncion, Paraguay, in retaliation for his father's
outspoken criticism of President Alfredo Stroessner. In 1978, twenty-two
adults and twelve children died at the hands of the PLO on a highway
outside Tel Aviv, hostages in an attempt by the PLO to force the release of
members of their group from Israeli prisons.
In each of these cases the survivors of the victims brought suit in a United
States federal court under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the
ATCA), alleging violations of international law. Two of the suits were
successful. In Filartigav. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit held that official
torture is a violation of international law.' Moreover, in Von Dardel v.
U.S.S.R., a suit brought on behalf of Raoul Wallenberg, the district court
for the District of Columbia held that violation of diplomatic immunity is
2
prohibited by international law.
The third suit, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, was dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.' In upholding the dismissal, the court of
appeals for the District of Columbia issued three widely disparate opinions.
The opinions ranged from an approval of the Second Circuit's interpretation
of international law in Filartiga4 to sharp criticism of the use of the ATCA
as a means to redress human rights violations.'
The three opinions in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic are representative
of the controversy currently raging over the adjudication of international
law under the ATCA. The controversy raises two questions: 1) whether
violations of international standards of human rights are proscribed by

1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Accord Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984). See generally Blum
and Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdictionover InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort
Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HAuv. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981).
2. Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
3. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
4. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
5. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
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international law, 6 and 2) what the appropriate role of the judiciary is in
7
resolving issues that may impact on the foreign policies of the United States.
The result has been a sharp division of judicial opinion on the proper
construction of the ATCA.8
This Comment proposes that a broad construction of the ATCA that
recognizes a cause of action for violations of human rights is more wellreasoned and more workable than a narrow construction based on restrictive
and often outdated conceptions of international law. Consequently, nine
violations of international law that impact upon generally recognized human
rights, in addition to torture and violation of diplomatic immunity, should
be actionable under the ATCA. These violations include (1) apartheid, (2)
arbitrary arrest and detention, (3) unlawful medical experimentation, (4)
genocide, (5) hijacking of civilian aircraft, (6) piracy, (7) slavery, (8) summary
execution, and (9) war crimes. This Comment discusses human rights under
international law and the history of the ATCA. Moreover, this Comment
surveys the construction of the ATCA in cases not involving human rights
violations and analyzes the approaches of the courts on both sides of the
controversy over the adjudication of human rights violations. Furthermore,
this Comment presents a justification for the use of the ATCA to redress
violations of the international law of human rights. Finally, this Comment
addresses the nine violations in the context of the nature of the right under
international law and the resolution of the questions raised by the courts.
II.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS

"Human rights" refers to a broad range of rights and freedoms to which
every person is entitled. 9 Based on standards widely accepted in the inter-

6. Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) and Von Dardel v.

U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) with Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (no liability for private conduct under international law) and Tel-Oren v.

Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775, (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (no liability for private conduct under international law); id. at 798
(Bork, J., concurring) (no private cause of action under international law).
7. Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789-91, (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Edwards, J., concurring) (duty of courts to adjudicate

claims for which jurisdiction is proper) with id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring) (sensitive issues
of foreign policy beyond constitutional power of judiciary to determine).
8. Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (broad construction)
and Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) (broad construction) with TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985) (narrow construction).
9. P. SIEOHART, Tim INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1983); RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 701 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIOHTS

69-

72 (1950).
"Human rights" may be analogized to legal rights, in that the term "rights" is used to
include: 1) a right in the strict sense, 2) a privilege, 3) a power, and 4) an immunity. Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 29
(1913). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS (E. Pollack ed. 1971) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
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national community, 10 these rights are inalienable, inhering in each individual
by reason of their humanity." The violation of these rights are presumed to
have an impact on the world community in general and are, therefore, a

cause for international concern. 2
The international law of human rights represents a dramatic shift away
from the traditional view of international law as governing only relations
between states. 3 Traditional international law included only states within its

jurisdiction.14 Individuals were the objects of international law, inasmuch as
they were the intended beneficiaries of international agreements."' Rights and
6
duties arising under international law existed only between states .
The traditional doctrine of international law firmly supported the concept
of national sovereignty.' 7 As a result, a state's treatment of its own nationals

10. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9. Although international human rights norms serve to
define, to a greater or lesser extent, the modern conception of the limitations of human rights,
the source of human rights is in dispute. Two popular theories are natural law, which characterizes rights as an outgrowth of nature and thus transcendent to rights granted by the
political community, and legal positivism, which views all rights as granted by the state. See
Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN4 RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL

AND

POLICY

ISSUES 69, 77-81 (T. Meron ed. 1984) (discussion of historical bases and

modern premises of natural law and legal positivism theories). But see Murphy, Objections to
Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433 (1981) (disagreement over
content of human rights, based on cultural and philosophical disparities, impedes efforts to
establish world-wide system of human rights). See generally M. McDoUcAL, H. LASSWELL &
L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
11. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather

than States, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 18 (1982) (human rights are "permanent and universal, [and]
differ from rights .

. that a state can give and take away"); supra note 9. See generally A.
41-78 (1982); T. MACHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN LIBERTIES 158 (1975); D. MEYERS, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: A DEFENSE 2-21, 116-22 (1985).
.

GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are distinguishable from legal and political rights on the basis that, while
the latter require membership in a community, the former requires only the humanity of the
individual. See Blackstone, The Justification of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
9, at 90, 90-93. However, the term "human rights," in its broadest sense, has become a generic
term that includes civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.
12. Bassiouni, The ProscribingFunction of InternationalCriminal Law in the Processes
of InternationalProtection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 193, 194 (1982).

13.

OPPENHEIA'S INTERNATIONAL LAW:

A

TREATISE

20 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).

See generally T. WALKER, A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1895); G. MARTENS,
SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 4-5 (1795).
14. L. OPPENHEm, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (2d ed. 1912), reprinted in L. SOHN
& T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1 (1973). See generally
T. WALKER, supra note 13, at 1; G. MARTENS, supra note 13, at 4-5.
15. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 14, at 3; Sohn, supra note 11, at 1.
16. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 14, at 2; H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC LAW 210-11 (1901); KENT'S COMMENTARIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (J. Abdy ed.
1877) [hereinafter KENT'S COMMENTARIES].
17. P. SIEGHART, supra note 9, at 11-12; T. WALKER, supra note 13, at 19; KENT'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 16, at 40; G. MARTENS, supra note 13, at 69. See 1 F. WHARTON,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 172-186 (1887) (nonintervention of

United States based on sovereignty of foreign nations).
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was a matter of purely domestic concern.' Individuals were entitled only to
those rights which their states chose to grant to them; states were entitled
to derogate the rights of their nationals at their convenience. 19 Thus, the

traditional theory of international law focused on the rights of the states
rather than the individual.
The modern view of the individual and human rights under international
law developed largely from world outrage over the atrocities of World War

Two.20 The United Nations has played a critical role in the definition and
enumeration of human rights. The international human rights conventions

and the declarations of the United Nations, along with those of the Council
of Europe and the Organization of American States, 2' have established human
rights norms to which the majority of the international community has

agreed.2
The Charter of the United Nations expressly promotes respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 23 The Charter, as a treaty, is binding upon
Member States. 24 Disagreement exists, however, over the extent of the obligation imposed by the Charter primarily because its references to the
protection of human rights are phrased in broad, general language. Some

18. P.
MARTENS,

SIEGHART,

supra note 9, at 11; H.

LAUTERPACHT,

supra note 9, at 641; G.

supra note 13, at 82.

Classical international law recognized the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as an
exception to a state's sovereignty regarding its conduct toward its own nationals. The doctrine
was invoked to justify intervention when.a state's treatment of its nationals horrified the world.
I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 340-42 (1960); L.
OPPENHErm, supra note 13, at 312-13; H. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 428-29; KENT'S COMMENTARtES, supra note 16, at 40; Sohn, supra note 11, at 4-5; Sornarajah, International Colonialism
and Humanitarian Intervention, 11 GA. J. INT'L & CoiP. L. 45, 57-77 (1981). Contra J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 309-10 (5th ed.) (humanitarian intervention used by powerful
nations to justify illegal interference in domestic affairs of weaker nations).

19. Bassiouni, An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law and Practice, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 1607 (1981). But see P. SIEGHART, supra note 9,
at 6-9 (state's power to derogate rights of its nationals limited by citizenry's acceptance of
derogation); Lauerman, Man's Right to a Just Government and His Right to Disobey It, in
HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 331-34.

20. J.

HUMPHREY, HumAN RIGHTS AND TtE UNITED NATIONS

10-13 (1984); P.

SiEGHART,

supra note 9, at 14; Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights,
Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 18th Report, the United Nations

and Human Rights, reprinted in L.
OF HuMAN RIGHTS 506 (1973).

SOHN

& T.

BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

21. See, e.g., N. CHARTER; American Convention on Human Rights, November 22, 1969,
OASOR Ser. K/SV.1/I. 1,OAS Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr.l (January 7, 1970) [hereinafter American

Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, U.N.
G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI) [hereinafter International Covenant]; European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5

[hereinafter European Convention]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
U.N. Doc. A/810, 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
22.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, at reporter's notes.

23. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
24. P. SIEGHART, supra note 9, at 51; H.

LAUTERPACHT,

supra note 9, at 147.
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governments and commentators take the position that the Charter's provisions regarding human rights are too vague to be legally binding. 25 Others,
however, rely upon the enumeration of specific human rights in subsequent
international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,2 6 and the definition of those rights in the judgments of national and
international tribunals to interpret the Charter as obligating Member States
27
to take positive action to protect the human rights of their nationals.
The Universal Declaration is an enumeration of the rights referred to in
29
the Charter. 2 While the Universal Declaration has no legally binding effect,

it has had a significant impact on the international law of human rights. It
is generally recognized as defining international standards of human rights. 0
There is considerable support for the view that as a result of reliance on
some of the provisions of the Universal Declaration in a number of contexts,
the Declaration represents customary international law and is, as such,
3
binding upon all nations. '

The principles of international human rights established by the Universal
Declaration are mirrored in the general human rights instruments of other
international organizations, 32 as well as in a variety of international docu25. Concern for national sovereignty is the basis of this position, which interprets the
language of the human rights provisions of the Charter as obligating Member States only to
cooperate in the purposes of the United Nations. Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practiceof
the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law, 8 INT'L & Corn'. L.Q. 146, 160-61
(1959) (statement of British Foreign Secretary on position of United Kingdom); Hudson, Charter
Provisions of Human Rights in American Law, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 543, 545 (1950) ("Charter
provisions on human rights . . . state general purposes and create for the United States only
obligations to cooperate in promoting certain ends").
26. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, 71 (1948).
27. This position views the human rights provisions of the Charter as placing an affirmative obligation on Member States, who are legally bound, as parties to the Charter, to act
in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations. P. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS
91 (1948); Schwelb, InternationalCourt of Justice and Human Rights, 66 Am. J. Ir'L
L. 337,
339-51 (1972) (quoting Hersch Lauterpacht).
28. Sohn, supra note 11, at 16; Humphrey, The Implementation of InternationalHuman
Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 31, 33 (1978); Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in
InternationalLaw, 50 VA. L. REv. 435, 456 (1964). Contra OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 13, at 745 ("there is no warrant for assuming that [the Universal Declaration] can
properly be resorted to for the interpretation of the provisions of the Charter in the matter of
human rights and fundamental freedoms").
29. Opinion of the Secretary-General, 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L.610 (1962).
30. Secretary-General, 1971 Survey of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245, at
196; Greenberg, Race, Sex and Religious Discrimination in International Law, in 2 HumAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY IssuEs 314 (T. Meron ed. 1984); Humphrey,
supra note 28, at 32; Saario & Cass, The United Nations and the InternationalProtection of
Human Rights: A Legal Analysis and Interpretation, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 591, 596 (1977).
31. Sohn, supra note 11, at 17; Humphrey, supra note 28, at 32; Schachter, International
Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 68 (1978).
Contra H. LAIJTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 408-17 (discussion of lack of binding legal effect of
Universal Declaration).
32. American Convention, supra note 21; European Convention, supra note 21.
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ments prohibiting specific conduct. 33 As multilateral conventions, these agree-

ments are binding only upon the signatory states. Some conventions, however,
represent the customs and practices of nations;3 4 others represent general
principles of law recognized by a majority of nations." Whatever their
nature, these conventions are arguably international law that is binding upon
3
all states.

6

III.

THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMs ACT

The Alien Tort Claims Act provides that "the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The
ATCA was enacted, in substantially the same form as it exists today, as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.17 The legislative history of the Judiciary
Act neither mentions the ATCA nor provides conclusive evidence as to

Congress's intent in enacting it."
33. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York), opened for signature December
14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention
for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature November
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Hijacking Convention), September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (Hague Hijacking Convention), December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No.
7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on the High Seas (Geneva Convention on the Law of the
Sea), April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. il; Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery, September 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 2301, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Abolition
of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, September 7,
1956, 18 U.S.T. 2301, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention (No. 105) Concerning
the Abolition of Forced Labour, 320 U.N.T.S. 291; Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, March 21, 1950, 96
U.N.T.S. 271; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Slavery Convention, September
25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; International Convention for the
Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, opened for signature September 30, 1921, 9
L.N.T.S. 415; International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, March
18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, T.S. No. 496, 1 L.N.T.S. 84.
34. See infra notes 173-75 & 177-80 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 127 & 158 and accompanying text.
36. Humphrey, supra note 28, at 32.
37. Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
38. 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES [ANNALS OF
CONGRESS]. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HAxv. L. REV. 49 (1923) (discussion of possible history of enactment of Judiciary Act).
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The grant to the federal courts of jurisdiction over questions of international law was part of the general scheme of the Judiciary Act to bring
issues of international law under the purview of the federal, rather than the

state, courts.3 9 The history of the Judiciary Act demonstrates the concern in
Congress that claims involving foreign nationals or states should have a
federal forum because of their potential impact on foreign relations.4 Without the enactment of the Alien Tort Claims Act, tort actions by aliens would
4
have been left to state courts. '
The incorporation of international law into the federal common law gives

42
the federal courts the power to adjudicate questions of international law.

The doctrine of incorporation was recognized in England at the time when
the American colonies were established and so was part of the legal tradition
adopted by the colonial governments. 4 3 The continuing adjudication of such
claims by the federal courts subsequent to American independence demonstrates the doctrine's on-going vitality."

Questions of international law present problems for the courts because
much of international law is neither codified in treaties nor incorporated
into municipal law by legislative enactment. The sources from which international law may be derived, however, have been recognized by both international treaty and United States courts. 45 These sources are international
conventions, the customs and usages of nations, general principles of law

recognized by civilized nations, the writings of the most distinguished jurists
and commentators, and judicial decisions.

39. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1003 (1985). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton); Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 36-51
(1952) (discussion of history of federal court authority over international law and relevant provisions of Judiciary Act).
40. Id. See generally Dickinson, supra note 39, at 36-51.
41. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. Id. See Dickinson, supra note 39, at 34. But see Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561 (1984) (international law similar, but not
identical, to federal common law).
43. Henkin, supra note 42, at 1555-57; Dickinson, supra note 39, at 33.
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060-61 (customs of nations and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations among
sources from which International Court derives international law). See also The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1885), for sources of international
law); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (in absence of treaty or statute, courts must
look to acts and usages of nations as one of the sources of international law); The Antelope,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 99 (1825) (court must seek international law in, inter alia, general
usage and practice of nations); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820)
(general usages and practices of nations are one of the sources from which international law
may be ascertained).
45. Id. See generally Comment, Custom and General Principles as Sources of International Law in American Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 751 (1982).
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT

Courts have generally construed the Alien Tort Claims Act narrowly.
Several recurring questions appear in the case law: 1) Has an actual violation
of international law occurred?6 2) Does international law grant a private
cause of action? 47 3) Does international law impose liability upon private
actors for private conduct? 48 4) Is adjudication of the claim barred by one
or more of the doctrines of political question, sovereign immunity, and act

of state?

49

A violation of international law is one of two jurisdictional requirements
of the ATCA. The second requirement is that the conduct be in the nature

of a tort. Most courts have read the ATCA to require that the tort claim
and the violation of international law claim be based upon the same conduct.o
The determination that a violation of international law exists requires the
court to consider whether international law or municipal law governs the

46. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978) (wrongful death
in airplane crash not in violation of international law); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625
(6th Cir. 1978) (child custody not governed by international law); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (wrongful confiscation of property not violation of international law);
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (fraud and conversion not violations of
international law); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973) (fraud not a
violation of international law); Khedivial Line v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1960) (free access of foreign ships to United States ports not guaranteed by international law);
DeWit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (tortious interference
with business relationship not violation of international law); Kianoosh Jafari v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Iranian government's expropriation of property of
its nationals not violation of international law); Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (negligence not governed by international law); Lopes
v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (negligence not governed by
international law).
47. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801-08, (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1976) (international law not self-executing); Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C.
1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.) (international law not self-executing), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 835 (1960).
48. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (no individual liability
under international law for support of Nicaraguan rebels by United States government officials
acting in private capacity); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (no liability under international law for private acts of torture),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
49. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (claim presented nonjusticiable political question); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F.
Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (claim presented nonjusticiable political question); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., concurring) (claim
presented nonjusticiable political question), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Frolova v.
U.S.S.R., 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. 111.1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (claim barred
by sovereign immunity and act of state).
50. ContraAbdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (violation
of international law of falsification of passport separate act from tort of unlawful withholding
of custody of child).
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conduct alleged. If the court concludes that municipal law prohibits the

conduct, the claim has not alleged a violation of international law and must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Constitutional claims," international
torts 2 and negligence claims53 have been denied on this basis.
The existence of a private cause of action means that international law

grants an individual an enforceable right. Although international law is
generally recognized as creating rights of individuals, it does not necessarily
create a concurrent right of enforcement. 5 4 The issue has arisen in claims
brought under the ATCA in two contexts: 1) when the claim is based on an
alleged violation of a treaty that is not self-executing, 55 and 2) when the
court has concluded that only nations can enforce rights under international
56
law.
The issue of liability for private conduct focuses on the duties imposed
by international law on states and individuals. Individual liability for official
conduct in violation of international law in certain contexts has been wellestablished by international consensus .7 However, an individual acting in a
private capacity may be liable only under municipal law. The resolution of
the question of private liability depends upon the type of conduct involved.
Private liability for piracy, slavery, and war crimes has long been recognized
under customary international law.58 Furthermore, private liability for apartheid, genocide, and hijacking of civilian aircraft has been established by
59
international conventions proscribing such conduct.

51. Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (first amendment right to
freedom of speech).
52. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (conversion); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973)
(fraud); Kianoosh Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Il1. 1982)
(conversion).
53. Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
54. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (1970).
55. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C.
1958) aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).
56. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
57. International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, supra note 33, art. 3; Convention on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, art. 2, G.A. Res./2391 (XXIII) (Dec. 9, 1968);
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in
the Judgment of the Tribunal (International Law Commission), U.N. GAOR V, Supp. 12 (A/
1316) 11-14 (1950); Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 33, art. 4; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472, 82 U.N.T.S.
279, 3 Bevans 1238.
58. See infra notes 169-90 & 200-06 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 127-38 & 155-68 and accompanying text.
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The doctrines of political question, sovereign immunity, and act of state
may bar claims brought under the ATCA in certain circumstances. These
doctrines developed from considerations of the appropriate role of the
judiciary in the determination of claims that raise issues of foreign policy.
The applicability of each of the doctrines would depend upon the factual
circumstances of a particular case.
The doctrine of political question must be invoked when the court is faced
with an issue beyond its constitutional powers of determination. Adjudication
of such an issue would require the court to intervene in the sphere of foreign
relations reserved to the political branches of the government.60 The doctrine
has barred claims brought under the ATCA when the act alleged has been
committed by the executive branch of the United States government. 61
Sovereign immunity prevents the courts from imposing liability on a
foreign sovereign except in limited circumstances. 62 The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (the F.S.I.A.)6 31 codified the restrictive common law doctrine
of sovereign immunity, which was used by the courts when the F.S.I.A. was
enacted in 1976. However, under the F.S.I.A., a foreign state may not assert
immunity in suits based on its commercial activities.6 Moreover, the F.S.I.A.

60. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
outlined the test for a political question:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although
each has one or more elements which may identify it as essentially a function of
the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
an unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id. at 217.
61. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Greenham Women
Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1985). See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Robb, J., concurring) (suit for compensatory damages for tortious action in violation of
international law is a nonjusticiable political question and must be dismissed), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1003 (1985).
62. Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 558 F. Supp. 358 (ND.. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th
Cir. 1985); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
63. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611.
64. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 states, in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States ...

in any case -

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on the United
States by the foreign states; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an
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provides for certain exceptions to immunity in suits based on noncommercial
activity, such as actions for money damages for specified torts committed
by the foreign state or its agent that occur within the United States. 65 In
addition, the F.S.I.A. gives to the judiciary, rather that the executive, the
determination of sovereign immunity.6 Any claim of immunity is subject to
all applicable international agreements to which the United States was a
67
party when the F.S.I.A. was enacted.
The act of state doctrine restrains the courts from judging the validity of
an act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory. It is a judiciallycreated doctrine based upon considerations of sovereignty and the conduct
of foreign policy. 6 The doctrine acts to bar the adjudication of the validity

act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States ....
65. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(5).
66. Section 1602 states:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claim
of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the
interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants
in United States courts ....

Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth

be decided by courts of the United States in conformity with the principles set forth
in this chapter.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. This provision would include all human rights agreements to which
the United States is a party.
68. The Supreme Court first formulated the act of state doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), in which Chief Justice Fuller wrote, "Every sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."
Id. at 252.
The Court extended the act of state doctrine to the acts of persons not traditionally
recognized as agents of a state in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
The Court then carved out two major exceptions to the doctrine in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc., v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), and First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1976). In First Nat'l City Bank, the Court held that,
because of the executive's primacy in foreign affairs, the act of state doctrine should not be
applied by the courts when the executive states that determination of the case on the merits
will not interfere with the conduct of foreign policy. 406 U.S. at 768. In Alfred Dunhill, the
Court, in a plurality opinion, held that a country's proprietary interest in the commercial
activity upon which the suit was based should not be protected by the act of state doctrine.
425 U.S. at 695. For a discussion of the effects of Sabbatino, First Nat'l City Bank and
Alfred Dunhill on the act of state doctrine, see Lengel, The Duty of Federal Courts to Apply
InternationalLaw: A Polemical Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV.
61, 65.
Justice Harlan outlined the considerations in determining the applicability of the doctrine
in Sabbatino:
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on federal and
state courts alike but compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution,
its continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters
bearing upon foreign affairs. It should be apparent that the greater the degree of
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of the act of the foreign state, but does not bar related claims. The courts
have invoked this doctrine when they have concluded that the act in question
is not clearly within the subject matter of international law. 69
V.

HUMAN

RIGHTS VIOLATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT

The cases in which human rights violations have been alleged have presented the courts with the four basic questions. The manner in which the
questions have been answered has depended upon the court's interpretation
of the ATCA. Thus, the courts usually interpret the Act broadly, as in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,70 or narrowly, as in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Re7
public. '
In Filartiga, a Paraguayan doctor and his daughter alleged that a Para72
guayan police official had tortured and murdered the doctor's teen-age son.
After unsuccessfully seeking prosecution of the murder in the Paraguayan
courts, the doctor and his daughter, then residing in the United States,
brought suit under the ATCA after they learned of the defendant's presence
in the United States. 3 The district court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that the law of nations did not deal with a state's
74
treatment of its own nationals.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that official torture violated international law. 7 The court determined the existence of an international law
violation by looking to international human rights agreements that prohibit

codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriateit is for the judiciary to render decisions regardingit ....
[T]he
less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.
376 U.S. at 427-29 (emphasis added).
Under this formulation of the appropriate application of the act of state doctrine, it should
be inapplicable to the nine human rights violations discussed in this Comment. The degree of
international consensus regarding each of the violations, as demonstrated primarily by international agreements, is sufficient to dispel any serious concerns regarding the conduct of United
States foreign policy.
69. Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Il1. 1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th
Cir. 1985) (refusal to allow plaintiff's husband to emigrate from U.S.S.R. was public act
protected by act of state doctrine); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984)
(act of state doctrine barred property claim of government's expropriation of property).
70. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
71. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. dehied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
72. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
73. Id. at 878-79.
74. Id. at 880.
75. Id. at 878. For a detailed discussion of the Second Circuit's opinion, see George,
Defining Filartiga: CharacterizingInternationalTorture Claims in United States Courts, 3 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
. On remand, the defendant, who had been deported to Paraguay, defaulted, and the
Filartigas' were awarded more than $10,000,000 in damages. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.
Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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torture. 76 The court concluded that the prohibitions of torture in international
agreements and the renunciation of the use of torture by many nations

demonstrated the universal consensus that made torture a violation of inter77
national law.
The Second Circuit analyzed the jurisdictional issue of a violation of
international law in several steps. First, it reasoned that international law
must be interpreted as it exists today rather than as it existed in 1789, when
the ATCA was enacted.7 1 Second, the court looked to the sources of international law outlined by the Supreme Court. 79 Third, it construed the ATCA
as allowing the federal courts to adjudicate existing rights under international

law rather than as granting new rights. s0 Fourth, it considered that freedom
from torture is a right clearly recognized by international law.8" Based on
this analysis, the Second Circuit concluded that a violation of international
law existed, and that jurisdiction was therefore proper.
The court's determination that international law must be interpreted as it
exists today is well-founded. If the legislative history of the ATCA indicated

that Congress intended to limit federal jurisdiction to violations of international law recognized in 1789, the appropriate conclusion would be contrary
to that reached by the Second Circuit. However, the use of such a rule in
the absence of an indication of Congress's intent would lead to the unjustified

exclusion of modern violations of international law. The changing perception
of the individual's position under international law since 1789 and the
dramatic development of international law since the end of World War II
make such an exclusion unwarranted.
The sources of international law identified by the court have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, the municipal laws of other
nations, and codified international law. 82 The Statute of the International
Court of Justice 3 provides guidelines similar to those of the Supreme Court.

76. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881-84.
77. Id. at 888. In May, 1986, the "Torture Victim Protection Act of 1986" was introduced
in the House of Representatives as H.R. 4756, a bill to amend the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287. The Torture Victim Protection Act would provide for the civil
liability of any person who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing while acting under the
actual or apparent authority of any foreign nation. The Act would prevent the application of
any statute of limitations; however, it would limit liability by requiring an exhaustion of
remedies in the nation in which the conduct occurred. The Act would also amend 28 U.S.C.
to provide for the jurisdiction of the district courts over actions brought under the Torture
Victim Protection Act.
78. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881.
79. Id. at 880-88.
80. Id. at 887.
81. Id. at 880.
82. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is part of the United Nations Charter
and is thus a binding multilateral treaty. 59 Stat. 1055. For the cases in which the United States
Supreme Court has articulated the sources from which international law should be derived, see
supra note 45.
83. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060.
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The Statute identifies sources such as: (1) international conventions; (2) the
customs of nations; (3) general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; and (4) judicial decisions and the writings of the most qualified
commentators (as a subsidiary means).
The Second Circuit's construction of the ATCA, which allows the adjudication of pre-existing rights under international law, is based on its perception that the right to be free from official torture clearly exists under
international law. Thus, the court did not construe the ATCA as specifically
recognizing or granting a cause of action under international law. When
addressing the argument that the law of nations is not self-executing, the
court distinguished that issue from the question of jurisdiction.14 The court
perceived the necessary inquiry to be "whether Congress intended to confer
judicial powers, and whether it is authorized to do so by Article III."5 The
court left the question of the existence of a cause of action to a choice of
law determination.
The final step in the Second Circuit's analysis was the determination that
freedom from torture is a right recognized by international law. In making
this determination, the court looked to international agreements regarding
human rights, including provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and, more specifically, the Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture.8 6 In
addition, the court noted that torture is prohibited by the constitutions of
a number of nations. 87 Thus, relying on conventional international law and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, the court concluded
that international law prohibits official torture.
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the claim alleged an armed attack
on civilians in Israel by the PLO that resulted in the deaths of thirty-four
people. 8 The survivors of the attack and the representatives of those killed
brought suit in the district court for the District of Columbia. The district
court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal in three concurring opinions.
Judge Bork found that the lack of a private cause of action precluded
adjudication of the claim.8 9 Judge Edwards agreed with the Second Circuit's

84. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 881-84.
87. Id. at 882, 884.
88. 726 F.2d 744, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
89. Id. at 799. For a detailed criticism of Judge Bork's opinion, see D'Amato, Agora:
What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously
Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985). For a critical reply to Professor D'Amato, see Rubin,

Professor D'Amato's Concept of American Jurisdiction is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J.
L. 105 (1985).

INT'L

For a discussion of private causes of action under international law and Judge Bork's

opinion in Tel-Oren, see Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. ITrr'LL. & POL. 473 (1986).
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approach in Filartiga,but found no basis for extending international liability
to nonstate actors. 9° Judge Robb concluded that the political question doctrine barred the claim. 91
Judge Bork construed the ATCA as giving federal courts jurisdiction over
claims for which either federal or international law provides a cause of
action. 92 He read the opinions of the Second Circuit and Judge Edwards as
construing the ATCA to create a cause of action. 93 He found such a
construction "fundamentally wrong" where the court would be asked to
enforce principles of international law that might have a significant impact
94
on United States foreign policy.
Judge Bork found no express grant of a private cause of action under
federal common law, a federal statute, the relevant international conventions, 95 or general principles of international law. 96 He then considered
whether a cause of action ought to be implied. He found that the primary
consideration in the implication of a cause of action is separation of powers,
which imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the judiciary to
act in areas, such as foreign relations, that are reserved to the political
branches.97

Judge Bork used the act of state and political question doctrines as the
limitations on judicial power over questions of international law based on
concerns of separation of powers. 9 Under both doctrines, the primary
concerns are the potential interference by the courts in the functions of the
political branches and the appropriateness of judicial resolution of an issue.
Judge Bork concluded that, although neither the act of state nor the political
question doctrine should be invoked in this case, the concerns of separation
of powers required that the question of the existence of a cause of action
be answered in the negative.
Judge Bork's requirement of a cause of action under international law
would have been appropriate if the claim had relied upon a violation of a
treaty of the United States. Treaties have long been recognized as non-selfexecuting in the absence of a provision granting a private cause of action in
the treaty or in municipal law. 99 If such a provision is not included, only

90. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791.
91. Id. at 823.
92. Id. at 808.
93. Id. at 801.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 808-09.
96. Id.
97. Id.at 801.
98. Id.at 801-06.
99. Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. I11. 1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th
Cir. 1985).
The United Nations Charter was held self-executing in Sei Fujii v. State; 217 P.2d 481
(Dist. Ct. App. 1950), afjld, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter had been used by the appellate court to invalidate a state law, the Alien Land Law of
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the states that are parties to the treaty, not individuals, may make claims
under it. The basis of the limitation is that the state-parties to the treaty
would have included such a provision had they intended to make themselves
liable to individual claims.10°
However, the analysis does not work as well with customary international
law or general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International
law derived from these two sources is binding upon all states.10' Treaties and
conventions may define or enumerate rights that derive from customary
international law or general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,
but such rights are not created by the treaty or convention. The requirement
of a cause of action under customary international law or general principles
of law recognized by the international community cannot be analogized to
the doctrine of the self-execution of treaties.
Judge Edwards correctly considered that international law imposes liability
for torture only upon states.10 2 Moreover, he went on to note that individual
liability under international law has not been clearly established. 03 While his
conclusion regarding torture is correct, he failed to consider that international
law clearly imposes individual liability for certain international crimes such
as apartheid and genocide. °
Judge Robb found the political question doctrine controlling because the
determination of the liability of the PLO for an act of terrorism would
require judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy by the political
branches. 05 He based his conclusion largely on the political branches' refusal
to recognize the PLO and the inappropriateness of judicial recognition of
the PLO in light of that decision.' ° He further considered the difficulty that
adjudication of the claim would present for the court. 0 7 While his invocation
of the political question doctrine is well-founded in a case alleging politically

California, that discriminated against Japanese persons in the ownership of real property in
California. The court held that the Charter, as a treaty, overrode the state law under the
supremacy clause. The California Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's reasoning,
holding that articles 55 and 56 of the Charter are not self-executing, but invalidated the Alien
Land Law'under the fourteenth amendment. 38 Cal. 2d at 720-28, 242 P.2d at 619-24.
A claim under the ATCA alleging violation of the United Nations Charter, the Treaty of
Extradition between the United States and Canada, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237, and the
law of nations was dismissed in Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). The
court concluded that the ATCA "ldid] not create a cause of acion for a plaintiff seeking
recovery under a treaty," id. at 1378, but failed to address the existence of a cause of action
under the law of nations.
100. Frolova, 558 F. Supp. at 374.
101. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060-61.
102. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792.
103. Id.at 824.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
105. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 825.
106. Id. at 824.
107. Id. at 823-24.
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motivated acts of terrorism by a group that the federal government has
chosen not to acknowledge, the application would be inappropriate in cases
that raise less sensitive issues.
The two interpretations of the ATCA demonstrate the confusion present
in the courts regarding the proper scope of the Act. At the basis of each of
the grounds for denial of jurisdiction lies the reluctance of the courts to
determine substantive rights under international law. This reluctance, however, is also a policy determination that the courts should not resolve the
types of issues that are commonly presented in these cases. However, that
policy determination is only appropriate when the claim is clearly barred by
the doctrines of political question, sovereign immunity, or act of state.
VI.

THE USE OF THE ATCA TO REDRESS HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

The evolution of international human rights law since the establishment
of the United Nations has changed the concept of state sovereignty.' 0 The
international community has manifested its concern with states' treatment
of their own nationals in the'numerous international conventions prohibiting
conduct that violates human rights.' °9 In addition, many nations have claimed,
based upon the international agreements or simply on humanitarian concerns,
the right to protest other nations' violations of human rights and to influence
the offending states, by nonmilitary means, to observe their obligations
under international law."10
Human rights are no longer the subject of the domestic jurisdiction of
states."' Where international law has imposed the obligation to observe

108. Prior to the establishment of the United Nations, a state's right to treat its nationals
as it chose, with the limited exception of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, was a
sovereign right. In contrast, the modern international law of human rights has created international obligations requiring states to observe human rights norms. See supra text accompanying
notes 17-22. As one commentator has observed:
[T]he human rights revolution that began at the 1945 San Francisco Conference
of the United Nations has deprived the sovereign states of the lordly privilege of
being the sole possessors of rights under international law. States have had to
concede to ordinary human beings the status of subjects of international law, to
concede that individuals are no longer mere objects, mere pawns in the hands of
states.
Sohn, supra note 11, at 1.
109. See supra notes 21, 32 and 33.
110. The international criticism of South Africa's apartheid policy is a prime example.
Many countries have signed the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid, supra note 33, the preamble of which specifically mentions South
Africa. Some nations have adopted economic sanctions against South Africa in an effort to
influence the South African government to alter its policy. The failure of the United States to
follow suit has been the subject of significant criticism.
111. Henkin, Human Rights and "Domestic Jurisdiction", in T. BUERGENTHAL, HUMAN
RirsTs, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELisKI AccoRD 21, 22 (1977) ("that which is governed
by international law or agreement is ipso facto and by definition not a matter of domestic
jurisdiction"). Henkin points out, however, that disagreement exists over the boundaries between
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human rights on states, those rights are the subject matter of international
jurisdiction.1 1 2 The lack of means of enforcement at the international level
does not negate a state's international obligations.' 3
International law prohibits intervention in the internal affairs, or domestic
jurisdiction, of a state by other states. 1 4 Since violations of human rights
are not longer solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, a response
by another state that does not constitute the use of force or threat of force
does not violate international law. Thus, the adjudication of violations of
human rights in United States federal courts is consistent with international
law.
The adjudication of substantive rights under international law is constitutional under Article III, which grants to the federal judiciary the authority
to hear cases "arising under . . . the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made . .".1."I" The Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed that the law of nations, which includes customary international law
and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, is part of the
law of the United States." 6 Since treaties, customary international law and
general principles of law are the sources to which a court would look in the
determination of a human rights violation, adjudication of such claims is
consistent with the Constitution.
The language of the ATCA clearly allows the adjudication of human rights
violations as "torts committed in violation of the law of nations."" 7 Such
claims violate neither the Constitution nor international law. The refusal of
the courts to adjudicate these claims is an evasion of judicial authority and
responsibility.
The doctrines of political question, sovereign immunity, and act of state
are sufficient to prevent the inappropriate exercise of judicial power."' When
properly invoked in accordance with Supreme Court and congressional guide-

domestic and international jurisdiction. Id.
The Permanent Court of International Justice, in its 1923 decision in Tunis-Morocco
Nationality Decrees, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, no. 4, 1, noted that when a state enters into an
international agreement on a particular subject, the state has removed that subject from its
domestic jurisdiction. See Leary, When Does the Implementation of International Human
Rights Constitute Interference into the Essentially Domestic Affairs of a State?, in INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND PRACTICE 15, 21 (J.C. Tuttle ed. 1978) ("gross violations of
human rights can no longer be considered a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the offending state under the U.N. Charter .... ")..
112. Sohn, supra note 11, at 7; Henkin, supra note 111, at 23.
113. Sohn, supra note 11, at 12 ("there are no effective means of implementing these
[human rights] documents ... [but] international law as a whole suffers from the same
shortcoming because methods of enforcement are still deficient").
114. Henkin, supra note 111, at 22.
115. U.S. CoNsT. art. III.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.
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lines, these doctrines keep the federal courts from resolving issues that will
affect United States foreign relations and foreign policy. The unwarranted
application of any of the doctrines, however, denies the alien victim of a
human rights violation a lawful opportunity to redress an injury.
The courts' concern regarding the appropriateness of federal courts hearing
claims based on extra-territorial human rights violations is unfounded. None
of the cases in which a court has allowed a claim under the ATCA has
resulted in repercussions in the conduct of United States foreign policy.
Unless Congress changes the present law, the courts should not refuse to
hear such claims.
VII.

HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

The ATCA requires a tort and a violation of international law in order
for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction. By nature, violations of the rights
to life, liberty and personal security sound in tort.'19 Violations of economic
or property rights may also be torts, but the federal courts have been
unwilling to recognize such rights as clearly within the subject matter of
20

1
international law.

Courts must make three determinations regarding international human
rights violations: 1) the source of the right in international law; 2) the nature
of the substantive right and the nature of the duty under international law;
and 3) the standard or test to be used to determine if the right has been
violated, i.e., if the duty has been breached.' 2' The source may be any of

119. Under American tort law, the violation of the right to life gives rise to a statutorilycreated cause of action for wrongful death. The violation of the right to liberty gives rise to
an action for false imprisonment. The violation of the right to personal security gives rise to
an action for battery, and, most likely, assault.
One commentator has suggested that the appropriate analysis of a claim under the ATCA
requires two steps: 1) the existence of a tort under municipal law, and 2) the existence of a
violation of international law. Under this approach, the municipal tort and the violation of
international law could be based upon separate conduct. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over
InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1, 32-39 (1985). See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777-78 (Edwards, J., concurring). For an
example of this approach, see Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md.
1961).
120. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 1984) (Argentinian government's expropriation of national's property not violation of international law).
121. The analysis would require the court, first, to ascertain whether a right exists under
international law by looking to international agreements, customary international law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. A claim based on the right to education,
for example, which might exist under municipal law, would fail because international law does
not recognize a right to education.
Second, the court would have to determine the content of the right under international
law. For example, the beating of an arrestee by police is torture under color of official authority,
which violates international law. However, the beating of an individual by a private citizen
violates only municipal law. Thus, the right under international law is limited in scope to
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the sources recognized by United States courts or international tribunals.
The nature of the substantive right may be defined by multilateral conventions protecting certain rights or prohibiting certain conduct.' 22 The standard
may be either a standard of international law or a standard of national law
applied to international law.'23
Significant problems arise in making each of these determinations. The
source of the right, in order to be binding upon the international community
in general, must be either customary international law, which is limited to
the actual practices of states, or general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations. 124 The nature of the substantive right and the duty imposed
by international law may be delineated by looking to international agreements, but even then many of the rights lack clear definition. The identification of a standard or test, which will not be discussed in this Comment,
presents the greatest problem, since international law does not currently
provide many clear standards. The application of a standard recognized by
United States law would result in the "internationalization" of a standard
to which the international community has not agreed. 25

official torture.
The nature of the duty under international law is a corollary of the nature of the right
under international law; in other words, the determination of a right under international law
will frequently, though not always, result in a correlative determination of when and upon
whom there exists a duty not to violate that right. Summary execution is a good example. The
right to be free from summary execution is the right to be free from execution at the hands of
a public official, acting under color of law, absent a conviction by a competent tribunal. Thus,
the right to be free from summary execution delineates the duty as well: 1) public officials
must refrain from execution, 2) when there has not been a conviction by a competent court.
Third, the court must decide what standard to use in determining whether or not a right
has been violated. While international law prohibits arbitrary detention, there is no clearly
articulated standard as to how long an individual may be detained before the detention becomes
arbitrary.
122. Conventions aimed at the prohibition of specific conduct define that conduct. For
example, several slavery conventions provide definitions of what constitutes slavery, ranging
from "the status of a person over whom any of the rights associated with ownership are
exercised" to "debt bondage." See conventions cited infra notes 183-89. A court faced with a
claim alleging slavery would look to these conventions to determine the nature of the right
under international law.
123. See supra note 121 (lack of international standard for arbitrary detention).

124.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, § 702 comment a.

125. For example, the European Convention and the American Convention, supra note
21, require, as part of their prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention, that a detainee be
"promptly" presented before a judicial officer. Neither convention, however, defines "promptly."
A United States court hearing a claim alleging arbitrary detention might conclude that "promptness" requires presentment within two weeks, whereas the practice of the alien's home country
may require presentment within two months. In such a case, the court would have to look to
customary international law, i.e., the actual practices of nations, to determine whether detention
for two months without presentment violates international law. If two months of detention is
in accordance with the practice of a majority of nations, the imposition of the two-week
standard would be the imposition of a national standard to which the international community
has not agreed.
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The following nine violations of international law that impact upon human
rights1 26 should be actionable under a broad construction of the ATCA.
These violations were selected because the conduct is clearly prohibited by
either customary international law or general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; thus, the conduct violates international law if engaged
in by any member of the international community. The consensus among
nations that the conduct is prohibited is demonstrated by either the longstanding practices of nations, as is the case with customary international
law, or by the existence of a number of international agreements prohibiting
the conduct in question, as is the case with general principles of law.
1.

Apartheid

Apartheid is the state practice of racial segregation and discrimination for
the purpose of establishing and maintaining the dominance of one racial
group over another. 27 Tortious cts constituting apartheidare murder, the
infliction of serious physical o mental injury, arbitrary arrest and detention,
the imposition of living co ditions designed to result in the complete or
partial destruction of the grop, and forced labor.'
Apartheid is distinguishable from other violatiofns of human rights on the basis of its motive
of racial discrimination. 29 While acts constituting apartheid are similar to
those constituting other human rights violations, such as arbitrary arrest and
detention, apartheidis distinguishable as a state-sponsored program of racial
dominance. 3 0
Apartheid is neither practiced nor recognized as a legitimate policy by a
majority of nations.' 3' The practice violates both customary international
law and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. As a denial
of the rights to life, liberty and personal security, apartheid violates provisions of the Universal Declaration,3 2 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (the International Covenant),' 3 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the

126. The nine violations interfere with the rights to life, liberty and personal security. The
discussion herein is limited to violations of personal integrity because the international community perceives these rights as deserving of immediate protection from violation; hence, the
consensus among nations of the inalienability of these rights is greater than that regarding civil
and social rights. See Schachter, supra note 31, at 75-76 (rights to integrity of person seen as
requiring prompt fulfillment in all countries).

127. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, supra note 33, art. 2.

128. Id. art. 2, paragraphs (a), (b) and (e).
129. Id. art. 2.
130. Id.
131. Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention makes specific reference to the South African
practice of apartheid. This reference suggests that racial discrimination as practiced by other
nations is not the equivalent of apartheid.
132. Universal Declaration, supra note 21, arts. 2-7.
133. International Covenant, supra note 21, arts. 2, 6-9.
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European Convention), 34 and the American Convention on Human Rights
(the American Convention).' 3" Apartheid is specifically prohibited by the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid (the Apartheid Convention). 3 6 The preamble of the Apartheid
Convention includes a declaration by the State Parties that apartheid is a
crime under international law.' 37
Individual criminal liability for acts constituting apartheidis imposed by
article 3 of the Apartheid Convention.' 3 This provision demonstrates the
intention of the State Parties to hold individuals responsible for both private
and official acts constituting apartheid. Private liability arises when an
individual does not necessarily act as an agent of the state, but instead
commits the acts constituting apartheid with the encouragement or condonation of the state. Thus, international law imposes a duty on both state
and individual actors to refrain from acts constituting apartheid.
2. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
Arbitrary arrest and detention is the state practice of denial of certain
procedural safeguards considered by the international community as fundamental to the principles of justice. 3 9 Arrest and detention become arbitrary
when the individual is not provided with 1) the right to be informed of the
charges,' 4 0 2) the right to prompt presentment before a judicial officer,

'4

42

3) the right to a speedy trial or to release before trial, and 4) the right
to access to the courts for a determination if the arrest and detention are

134. European Convention, supra note 21, arts. 2-6 and 14.
135. American Convention, supra note 21, arts. 1 and 4-7.
136. International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, supra note 33.

137. The Apartheid Convention states:
Observing that, in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, certain acts which may also be qualified as acts of apartheid
constitute a crime under international law.
Observing that, in the Convention on non-applicability of statutory limitations
to war crimes and crimes against humanity, "inhuman acts resulting from the policy
of apartheid" are qualified as crimes against humanity. Observing that the General
Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions in which the policies and practices
of apartheid are condemned as a crime against humanity,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1. The State parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a
crime against humanity ...
138. Article III states that "[iinternational criminal liability shall apply ... to individuals."
Id.
139. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 702 comment g.
140. American Convention, supra note 21, at art. 7, para. 4; International Covenant,
supra note 21, art. 9, para. 2; European Convention, supra note 132, at art. 5, para. 2.
141. American Convention, supra note 21, art. 7, para. 5; International Covenant, supra
note 21, art. 9, para. 3; European Convention, supra note 21, art. 5, para. 3.
142. Id.
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lawful, and to release if they are not. 143 Arbitrary arrest and detention violate
the right to liberty.
Arbitrary arrest and detention are practiced by many nations and are thus
not prohibited by customary international law. Freedom from arbitrary arrest
and detention are, however, general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations and are binding international law. The Universal Declaration contains
a general prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention. 1 The specific procedural safeguards are enumerated, with some variation, in the International
Covenant, the European Convention, and the American Convention. 145
By its definition, arbitrary arrest and detention impose liability only on a
state and its agents. Actions by an individual acting under color of official
authority would create liability if the acts were committed by an agent of
the state acting without official sanction.146 Liability for private conduct
would not be imposed because of the absence of the individual's legal
authority to arrest or detain.
3.

Unlawful Medical Experimentation

Unlawful medical experimentation is the subjection of an individual to
medical procedures without informed consent and for a purpose other than
therapy. 4 7 Acts constituting unlawful medical experimentation include surgical procedures, or the injection, ingestion or inhalation of substances
48
calculated to result in physical or psychological alteration of the subject.
Unlawful medical experimentation may violate the rights to life, liberty and
personal security, depending upon the specific circumstances under which
the experimentation is conducted.
Unlawful medical experimentation violates general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The practice is prohibited by the provisions of
the Universal Declaration protecting the rights to life, liberty and personal
security, and the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 149 Such experimentation would violate similar provisions of the International Covenant, the European Convention, and the American
Convention. 150 The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, prohibit
experimentation during wartime on members of the armed forces, prisoners

143. American Convention, supra note 133, art. 7; International Covenant, supra note
21, art. 9, para. 4; European Convention, supra note 21, art. 5, para. 4.
144. Universal Declaration, supra note 21, art. 9.
145. See supra notes 138-41.
146. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 702 comment a.
147. Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 204.
148. Id.
149. Universal Declaration, supra note 21, arts. 3 and 5.
150. American Convention, supra note 21, art. 5, paras. I and 2; International Covenant,
supra note 21, art. 7; European Convention, supra note 21, art. 3.
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of war and civilians."' Moreover, unlawful medical experimentation falls
within the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis.5 2 Under
the Convention on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,' 53 crimes against humanity are also

prohibited during peacetime. The classification of unlawful medical experimentation as a war crime or crime against humanity imposes a duty upon
54
both state and individual actors to refrain from the prohibited conduct.'

4.

Genocide

Genocide is conduct calculated to cause the partial or complete destruction
of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.' Acts constituting genocide
include: 1) killing members of the group; 2) infliction of serious physical or

mental injury; 3) imposition of living conditions intended to bring about the
partial or complete physical destruction of the group; 4) imposition of

measures to prevent births; and 5) forcible transfer of children of the group
56
to another group.
Genocide is prohibited by general provisions for the rights to life, liberty
and personal security in the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant, the European Convention, and the American Convention.5 7 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide declares
genocide to be an international crime.'58 Furthermore, genocide is included

in the prohibition of crimes against humanity by the Convention on the
Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity. 5 9 The Genocide Convention and the Convention on the Non-

151. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 33; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra
note 33; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 33;
Geneva Convention Relative to. the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note
33.
152. 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 3 Bevans 1238.
153. G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/7342 (1968).
154. Id. art. 2.
155. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
33.
156. Id.
157. American Convention, supra note 21, art. 4; International Covenant, supra note 21,
art. 6; European Convention, supra note 21, art. 2; Universal Declaration, supra note 21, art.
3.
158. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment Crime of Genocide, supra note 33,
art. 1.
159. Convention on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 57, art. 1,para. b.
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applicability of Statutory Limitations expressly impose liability for both
individual and state conduct. 6°
5. Hijacking of Civilian Aircraft
The hijacking of civilian aircraft is the intentional use of force or threat
of use of force to gain control of an aircraft, to endanger the safety of the

persons on board, or to endanger the safe operation of the aircraft in
flight. 16 Hijacking is not practiced by states and thus violates customary
international law. Because the hijacking of civilian aircraft results in the
intentional deprivation of life, liberty or personal security to persons62 on
board the aircraft, the action constitutes a violation of human rights.
The hijacking of civilian aircraft is prohibited by the Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo
Hijacking Convention), 63 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Hijacking Convention),'6 and the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Hijacking Convention). 65 These conventions demonstrate that, in
contrast to other acts of terrorism that have been legitimized by some nations
as acts in furtherance of wars of national liberation,'6 the hijacking of
civilian aircraft has been condemned by the international community. International law imposes a duty on individuals to refrain from the prohibited
conduct. 67 States would incur liability for the assistance to, or cooperation
with, individuals who have committed acts constituting hijacking. '8
6. Piracy
Piracy is any act of violence, detention or depredation for private ends
by the passengers or crew of a private ship or aircraft committed on the
high seas against another ship or aircraft, against persons or property on
board such other ships or aircraft, or committed outside the territory of any
state against any ship, aircraft, person or property.

69

Acts of piracy that

include violence against, or detention of, persons would result in the dep-

160. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
33, art. 4; Convention on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 57, art. 2.
161. Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 204.
162. Id.
163. 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6769.
164. 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
165. 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
166. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795-96.
167. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, supra
note 163, art. 1.
168. See conventions cited supra notes 163-65.
169. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 608-09.
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rivation of the rights to life, liberty or personal security. 11 Piracy violates
customary international law. 7 '
Piracy is an international crime. 72 Piracy is prohibited by the Nyon
Arrangement,'

the Agreement Supplemental to the Nyon Arrangement,' 7 4

and the Convention on the High Seas.'

7

Because piracy includes only acts

committed for private ends, international law imposes a duty only on indi-

viduals to refrain from acts of piracy.
7.

71

Slavery and Related Practices

Slavery is the status of an individual over whom any or all of the rights
attaching to ownership are exercised. 77 Practices similar to slavery include
debt bondage, 78 sexual bondage, 79 serfdom,8 0 marital bondage' and forced
or compulsory labor. 8 2 Slavery and related practices violate the right to
liberty.
Slavery violates specific provisions of the Universal Declaration,' 83 the
International Covenant, 8 4 the European Convention, 85 and the American
Convention. 8 6 Slavery is also prohibited by a number of specific international
agreements, such as the Slavery Convention (1926),187 the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions

and Practices Similar to Slavery,'

and the Convention for the Suppression

of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others.
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170. Bassiouni, supra note 12.
171. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 609.
172. Id.
173. 181 L.N.T.S. 135.
174. 181 L.N.T.S. 149.
175. 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
176. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 608, 616.
177. Slavery Convention, supra note 33, art. 1. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
178. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, supra note 33, art. 1.
179. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others, supra note 33, art. 1.
180. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, supra note 33, art. 1, para. b.
181. Id. art. 1, para. c.
182. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, art. 2, 39
U.N.T.S. 55.
183. Universal Declaration, supra note 21, art. 4.
184. International Covenant, supra note 21, art. 8.
185. European Convention, supra note 21, art. 4.
186. American Convention, supra note 21, art. 6.
187. Slavery Convention, supra note 33.
188. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, supra note 33.
189. Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, supra note 33.
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International law imposes liability both for individual and state conduct that
9°
constitutes slavery.
8.

Summary Execution

Summary execution is the execution of an individual by a state that does
not result from a conviction in accordance with generally accepted principles
of justice. 91 International law recognizes capital punishment as a legitimate
criminal sanction only when it is imposed by a competent, impartial court
for a serious crime for which such punishment may be imposed by laws in
effect at the time of the occurrence of the crime.'92 Summary execution is
practiced by many nations and does not violate customary international law.
Most nations, however, denounce summary execution in principle; thus, it
is a violation of general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
Summary execution violates general provisions of the Universal Declaration, 93 the International Covenant,' 94 the European Convention,' 95 and the
American Convention,' 96 as well as provisions outlining procedural safeguards in the International Covenant' 97 and the American Convention.'9 8
International law imposes a duty only to states to refrain from summary
execution. 99 Individual conduct of the same nature would violate municipal
law prohibiting murder.
9.

War Crimes

War crimes are violations of the laws or customs of war. 200 Acts constituting war crimes include, inter alia, the murder or ill-treatment of civilian
populations, prisoners of war, or members of the armed forces on land or
on the seas; the deportation of civilian populations of or in occupied territory;
and the killing of hostages. 20 1 War crimes against persons may violate the
rights to life, liberty and personal security. War crimes violate customary
international law and general principles of law recognized by civilized

nations

202

190. Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 197.
191. RESTATEMENT, Supra note 9, § 702 comment e.
192. American Convention, supra note 21, art. 4; International Covenant, supra note 21,
art. 6, paras. 1-2 and 4-5.
193. Universal Declaration, supra note 21, art. 3.
194. International Covenant, supra note 21, art. 6.
195. European Convention, supra note 21, art. 2.
196. American Convention, supra note 21, art. 4.
197. International Covenant, supra note 21, art. 9.
198. American Convention, supra note 21, art. 7.
199. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 702.
200. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 57, art. 6, para. b.
201. Id.
202. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (3d ed. 1979).
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War crimes are prohibited by all of the Geneva Conventions, 20° the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 204 and the Convention
on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity. 20 1 Moreover, international law imposes liability for state
26
conduct and for individual conduct, whether official or private. 0
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The adjudication of human rights violations under the ATCA will continue
to present problems for the courts until the substantive rights under international law are more clearly delineated, and the appropriate standards are
identified. However, the confusion created by the courts that construe the
ATCA narrowly compounds the problem. The narrow construction is in
reality a policy determination that the courts should not resolve the issues
presented by violations of human rights. Despite the difficulty of resolving
those issues, there exists sufficient consensus on, and definition of, substantive human rights under international law for the courts to adjudicate such
claims. By employing a broad construction, the nine violations of international law that impact upon human rights proposed herein should be actionable under the ATCA.
Helen C. Lucas

203. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 33; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra
note 33; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 33;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note
33.
204. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 57.
205. Convention on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 57, art. I.
206. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 57, art.7.

